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The question of accountability seems to perpetually plague the European Union. 
Whether the concern of traditional Eurosceptics or those intent on pushing the EU 
down a more democratic track, accountability is a topic that seems to follow any 
discussion on the EU around like a bad smell. However, such discussions of 
accountability usually revolve around the domestic policy of the EU or how such 
policy impacts on individual member states and their citizens, the question of 
accountability in EU foreign policy is largely ignored by mainstream media outlets 
and tub-thumping Eurosceptics alike. 
 
Let us side step for a second the argument that a lack of accountability in foreign 
policy is a general trend within international politics. The fact that up until very 
recently accountability in EU foreign policy has been largely ignored in both the 
annals of Brussels and the column inches of the European press is somewhat ironic 
when one considers many of the claims of the EU to soft power status are built around 
the promotion of norms such as accountability and transparency. Thus, the norms and 
values that the EU is so keen to be seen to promote in its immediate neighbourhood 
and beyond under the auspices of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and 
the European Commission are losing out to strategic interests abroad and at home, 
too. 
 
That is until the last few months. The uprisings in North Africa, the subsequent 
increase in migrants crossing the Mediterranean and the cataclysmic predictions about 
an end to the Schengen acquis has put not only Euro-Mediterranean relations past and 
present under the spotlight, it has highlighted a hitherto under-investigated policy 
practice in the relations between the EU, its individual member states (IMS) and non-
member partner states (NMPs): migration-management. 
 
With the fall of Tunisia‟s President Ben Ali and Libya‟s Colonel al-Gaddafi the role 
of these two NMPs in the migration-management practices of the EU and its IMS has 
come under greater scrutiny. In addition wider everyday practices of migration-
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management exercised by the EU and its IMS throughout the region have been 
dragged somewhat hesitantly out into the half-light. 
 
Accountability in action then? Well, kind of, sort of, maybe. There is a fundamental 
problem with accountability in EU migration-management practices that comes down 
to ascertaining who in fact is ultimately responsible. If structural systems and 
everyday practices within the EU, IMS and NMPs are designed in such a way as to 
firstly make access to information protracted and often impossible, and secondly 
remove responsibility from individuals and institutions it makes the work of NGOs, 




During the past two decades in Europe and elsewhere migration has been constructed 
as a destabilising force that is seen to endanger domestic, regional and international 
stability. Over this time migration has been both discursively and socially constructed 
as a „threat‟ and has been categorised along with terrorism and organised crime as 
something which the state and other institutional bodies must guard against.  
 
The construction and classification of migrants as destabilising is made possible by 
their location „outside‟ the territorial state (or regional) unit and their ability to 
challenge one of the primary functions of the state-unit, that of border control, which 
is itself understood as a core state activity. All states maintain the exclusive right to 
determine who and what can enter their territory. However, in recent years border 
policy has shifted from one of traditional defence and the taxation of trade to one of 
policing. Accompanying the increasing economic liberalisation of borders and the 
apparent demilitarisation of border controls is the increase in border law enforcement 
that itself has become highly militarised in character. As shown by the continued use 
of military vessels in securing the southern-border in the Mediterranean and the use of 
military personnel along the eastern-border, the building of heavily militarised fences 
in the Spanish exclaves of Melilla and Ceuta and now on the Greek-Turkish border. It 
is clear, therefore, that European militaries are now being used for „crime-fighting‟ as 
opposed to traditional defensive and „war-fighting‟ purposes. 
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In short, this securitisation of migration has enabled the policies and everyday 
practices of migration-management employed by the EU, IMS and NMPs to proceed 
in such a manner where security is placed before internationally agreed humanitarian 
obligations. Securitisation has also enabled migration-management to proceed without 
the level of transparency or accountability that the EU expects of those states in which 
it has been promoting democratic reform and good governance. Without classifying 
migration and migrants as a threat that needs to be secured against the management of 
migration would not fall under the rubric of security policy and responses would no 
doubt be very different. As scholars expounding on the process of securitisation have 
argued, once something is labelled and managed as a threat the rules of the game 
change as the response to „threats‟ calls for different and importantly more urgent 
policy responses. Migration-management as a securitized issue is no exception. 
 
Thus, when migrants threaten the territorial integrity of European space then they 
need to be kept out of that space at all costs. This, coupled with the idea that the EU is 
not only a regional power with strategic interests but a normative power with common 
values built around liberal democratic ideals, leads to the conclusion that the migrant 
threat must be managed outside of Europe for fear that carrying out the policies 
deemed necessary to police the threat should taint the liberal democratic heart of the 
European project. A similar logic lies behind policies of rendition and the use of 
authoritarian regimes in the questioning of terror suspects. The states/regions that 
practice what is called extraterritoriality or externalisation in migration-management, 
all of them – the USA, Canada, Australia and the EU and its IMS – consider 
themselves liberal democracies.  
 
Matthew Gibney from the University of Oxford‟s Refugee Studies Centre has argued 
that outsourcing migration-management allows liberal governments and institutions to 
eschew the constraints placed upon them by the very liberal democratic norms they 
are trying to circumvent. Thus, the need for the EU to maintain its liberal identity has 
meant that many of the everyday practices of migration-management, such as 
immigration prisons and various militarised responses are situated outside of Europe, 
outsourced in NMPs mostly in North African states with fewer humanitarian 
obligations and pretensions to a liberal identity with the knowledge and the funding of 
the EU and IMS and away from the prying eyes of the fifth estate. 
 4 
 
North Africa‟s role in the EU‟s migration-management strategy is directly linked to 
policies of externalisation. This is a strategic issue that follows on from the 
securitisation of migration and the removal of internal borders from within the EU 
and the concomitant strengthening of the EU‟s external borders that sees security 
within as being prima facie linked to security in the EU‟s southern and more recently 
eastern neighbourhoods. The need for externalisation, therefore, has been a driver of 
increased EU foreign policy with its immediate neighbours in the Mediterranean and 
Eastern Europe. In addition the practice of externalisation makes effective 
accountability within existing EU legislative structures near to impossible. 
 
Who’s in charge? 
 
The inside/outside nature of migration-management as both a domestic and foreign 
policy concern means that effective scrutiny and ultimately accountability gets lost in 
the gaps between the Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, currently Cecilia 
Malmström, the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood 
Policy, currently Štefan Füle and the High Representative of the EEAS, currently 
Catherine Ashton. When the Treaty of Lisbon created the EEAS there were a series of 
power-struggles with the Commission over which body would be responsible for 
certain areas of foreign policy. The EEAS is a separate body from the Commission 
and currently (as these issues are not yet fully resolved) responsible for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and everything that falls under its remit while the 
Commission remains responsible for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood 
Policy, aid – with its budget of around €6 billion – and development.  
 
As a phenomena that is spatially disaggregated migration falls under all of these 
foreign policy areas – as well as Justice and Home Affairs in the domestic sphere – 
and none of them at the same time. This is due to everyday practices of migration-
management that see the use of NMPs as external enforcers and sites of migrant 
control. So who is ultimately responsible for the policy decisions of the EU as they 
relate to migration-management? As migration-management is multi-faceted 
functioning at three levels: EU, IMS and NMPs, accountability has to effectively 
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function at these three levels also. Perhaps it is easier here to look at how migration-
management is practiced and how it is scrutinised to determine accountability.  
 
The work of Europarl 
 
The role of the European Parliament is like that of any other parliament, to scrutinise 
and hold accountable the work of the executive branch. Like many parliaments 
around the world scrutiny of the executive branch is undertaken by a committee 
structure, however, as already discussed the heterogeneous nature of migration-
management means that effectively scrutiny at the committee level can take place in 
two committees, Foreign Affairs and Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and 
the two Foreign Affairs sub-committees Human Rights and Security as well as in any 
number of temporary committees set up for the specific purpose of scrutinising 
particular policies.  
 
Certain members of the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs committee have 
been highly active in asking questions of the Commission in relation to recent migrant 
deaths in the Mediterranean following the Tunisian and Libyan uprisings. Meanwhile 
the Directorate-General for the External Policies of the Union, which oversees the 
running of all committee business within Europarl relating to foreign policy, produced 
a report in July on the „Effects of Migration Policies on Human Rights in the 
European Neighbourhood.‟ The report is unsurprisingly critical of the policy 
implementation and everyday practice of migration-management witnessed in NMPs 
and calls on Europarl to press for a more comprehensive and conditional policy in 
relation to ensuring human rights are upheld. However, the extent to which this 
welcome report is able to have any effect in the functioning of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy is questionable. That Action Plans – one of the main policy 
instruments used to govern the EU‟s relationship with NMPs – are drawn up without 
any consultation with Europarl at any stage is troublesome.  
 
Recent controversies mask years of impunity 
 
The recent controversies generated by an Amnesty International (AI) report on human 
rights abuses in Libya, a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report on the work of Frontex 
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in Greece and the Commission‟s response to the HRW report highlight the specific 
problems of accountability in migration-management both within the European Union 
and in NMPs where practices of externalisation take place. However, these recent 
controversies over Libya‟s treatment of migrants in Europe‟s outsourced migration-
management nexus and the actions of Frontex mask a long history of impunity when 
it comes to holding such practices to account. That responsibility for foreign policy is 
split between the EEAS and the Commission and that Frontex as an institutional body 
is set up in such a way as to make effective accountability all but impossible has 
meant that accountability of migration-management within both foreign and domestic 
policy and practice has been a long time coming. 
 
The AI report accuses the EU of „paying lip-service over the years to the human rights 
of refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants… (while) continuing to pursue a “border 
control” policy at the expense of guaranteeing the right to seek asylum and migrants‟ 
rights.‟ The report highlights the role of Italy in seeking the assistance of Libya to 
help in its own migration-control policies culminating in the „Friendship Pact‟ of 
2008 signed by Colonel al-Gaddafi and Silvio Berlusconi.  
 
The report also documents the October 2010 visit by the European Commission under 
the auspices of the ongoing negotiations of the bilateral „Framework Agreement‟, 
which would legally formalise the relationship between Libya and the EU. However, 
the trip undertaken by Commissioners Malmström and Füle did not only include 
negotiations over the „Framework Agreement‟. As the AI report and the 
Commission‟s own press release at the time notes it also included the signing of an 
agreement on the “management of migration flows” and border controls.  
Meanwhile, the HRW report was summarised thus: 
 
Between November 2, 2010 and March 2, 2011, nearly 12,000 migrants 
entering Greece at its land border with Turkey were arrested and detained. The 
detention facilities where they were held did not meet minimal human rights 
standards. Though their treatment varied from place to place, the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has held that migrant detention in Greece 
generally constitutes “inhuman and degrading treatment.”   
  
During this same period, the European Union‟s (EU) agency for the 
management of operational cooperation at external borders, Frontex, provided 
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Greece with both manpower and material support, made available by 
participating states, which facilitated the detention of those migrants in sub-
human conditions in Greece‟s overcrowded migrant detention centers. 
 
This report addresses this disturbing contradiction. Although the ECtHR 
(European Court of Human Rights) categorically ruled that the transfer of 
migrants to detention in Greece would expose them to prohibited abuse, an 
executive agency of the EU and border guards from EU member states 
knowingly facilitate such transfers.   
 
Frontex‟s response to the HRW report was issued on the same day and it stresses their 
commitment to the “Fundamental Rights” that it is legally obliged to uphold as an 
agency of the EU. Fundamental Rights that HRW believes Frontex has failed to 
uphold: 
Human Rights Watch believes that Frontex has fallen short of its obligations to 
respect the absolute prohibition on exposing individuals to inhuman and 
degrading treatment as a result of its cooperation with Greek authorities in 
detaining migrants in Greek detention facilities where the conditions violate 
European and international human rights standards. 
 
Frontex‟s response, however, stressed the fact that the agency is not responsible for 
“detention on the territory of the Member States, which remains their exclusive 
remit.” It continued by saying that it had „been expected to operate in an exceptional 
environment‟ and importantly „where an evaluation mechanism of the national 
migration management process is missing.‟ So this is in effect Frontex itself admitting 
that there is no way of holding the IMS‟ migration-management mechanisms with 
which they are expected to work to account. 
 
The Commission‟s response to the HRW report backs up Frontex‟s own response 
suggesting that as things stand Frontex is structurally unable to be held accountable. 
In a press briefing on September 21 Home Affairs Spokesman Michele Cercone 
responded to journalists questions regarding accountability by saying that Frontex 
cannot be held accountable for human rights abuses under Operation RABIT as 
Frontex‟s mandate and operational mission requires them to hand over intercepted 




In essence what this means – and this was repeated many times throughout the press 
briefing – is that only the member states where the specific Frontex operation is 
taking place can be held accountable. So in the case of Operation RABIT‟s failings in 
this regard according to Cercone and by extension the European Commission as he is 
their spokesman, only Greece itself can be held responsible. 
 
This effectively means that Frontex operates within a black-hole of accountability.  
 
These recent controversies are the culmination of at least sixteen years of foreign 
policies that have set the tone for an externalised and heterogeneous approach to 
migration-management that ultimately makes accountability extremely difficult. 
Scholars of EU foreign policy usually recognise the creation of the ENP as the point 
where EU foreign policy took a noticeable shift towards strategic interests. However, 
in the field of migration the Barcelona Declaration that gave rise to the ENP allowed 
for migration to be considered under a rubric of security and enabled the policies of 
externalisation that make attempts at accountability so problematic. 
 
Back to Barcelona 
 
From the beginning of the Barcelona Process, the strategic interests of the EU and 
IMS took precedence over any practical application of European norms of human 
rights, especially in relation to migrants. In addition, the EU‟s promotion of 
transparency and good governance, values it sees as forming an important part of its 
identity are severely challenged by the practices of migration-management. For 
example with the overthrow of President Ben Ali in Tunisia after twenty four years of 
authoritarian rule came the concomitant overthrow of a ban on the monitoring of 
Tunisian prisons. This has meant that there have been no independent inspections of 
Tunisian detention facilities since Tunisia signed the Barcelona Declaration and 
became a site for the practices of externalisation.  
 
To highlight this point even further not only have these detention facilities not been 
independently monitored but there is not even accurate data on how many migrant 
detention facilities exist. Various sources have reported as many as thirteen. So while 
inspections of detention facilities have not been possible and no one knows how many 
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there actually are, the bilateral relations that were encouraged under the Barcelona 
Declaration for the fight against illegal immigration have been in full swing. In 1998 
Italy signed an agreement with Tunisia on the readmission of Tunisian and third-
country nationals that included what was then 500 million liras for the building of 
detention facilities. Detention facilities that could not be inspected and detention 
facilities that may or may not even exist.  
 
Meanwhile a 2010 report by the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network on EU 
and Moroccan immigration practices concluded that EU cooperation with Morocco on 
migration-management „ran the risk of contributing to the implementation of 
migration policies that are contrary to the basic rights of migrants and refugees.‟ This 
report followed several agreements between the EU and Morocco over issues of 
migration and Morocco has received approximately €200 million for use in security 
related areas as laid down by the ENP in 2004, €40 million of which was for the 
specific purpose of strengthening border controls. However, no official review of 
Morocco‟s migration-management regime has been undertaken calling into question 
the accountability of such a regime that is pursued in the interests of the EU and 
directly funded by it. 
 
 
